How Can Gender Discrimination Explain Fertility Behaviors and Family-friends Policies ? by Recoules, Magali
How Can Gender Discrimination Explain Fertility
Behaviors and Family-friends Policies ?
Magali Recoules
To cite this version:
Magali Recoules. How Can Gender Discrimination Explain Fertility Behaviors and Family-
friends Policies ?. Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2008.98 - ISSN
: 1955-611X. 2008. <halshs-00348904>
HAL Id: halshs-00348904
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00348904
Submitted on 22 Dec 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Documents de Travail du
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13
http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CES-docs.htm
ISSN : 1955-611X
How Can Gender Discrimination Explain Fertility
Behaviors and Family-friendly Policies ?
Magali RECOULES
2008.98
How Can Gender D iscrimination Explain Fer-
t i l i ty Behaviors and Family-friendly Polic ies ?
by Magali Recoules

Decembe r 2008
Abstract
This paper focuses on the interaction between gender discrimination and
household decisions. It develops a general equilibrium model with endoge-
nous fertility, endogenous labor supply and endogenous size of government
spending. Family policies are assumed to decrease the time that parents
spend on their children. The model shows that gender discrimination may
explain dierences in household decisions between countries. The solution
shows a U-shaped relationship between fertility and gender discrimination.
An increase in the discrimination level implies a related decrease in fertility,
women' s participation in the labor force and in family-friendly policies .
JEL Classication: D1 3 , H31 , J1 3 , J71
Keywords : G ender discrimination, Fertility, Labor supply, Public poli-
c ies .
 . Paris S chool of Economics and Univers ity of Paris I, CES 1 06 -1 1 2 bld de l' Hopital^ 75647 Paris
C edex 1 3 ; Email : magalirecoules@hotmail . fr ; Fax number : +33 1 44 07 8 2 47
1
1 Introduction
S ince the middle of the 1 98 0s empirical studies have shown an inversion of the
cross-country correlation between the female labor supply and the fertility rates in
OECD countries ( N. Ahn and P . Mira 2002 [ 3 ] ) . The correlation has become posi-
tive, throwing back into question the traditional idea of substitution between
childbearing and women' s labor force partic ipation choices . Now, the countries
exhibiting the lowest levels of female employment are also those that have low fer-
tility rates . On the other hand, the countries that are characterized by the highest
levels of female employment are also those that have high fertility rates . Some
authors propose to explain this s ituation by changes in institutional context that
have helped to reconcile child-rearing with the participation of women in the
labor market ( A. Adesra 2 004 [ 1 ] ; K . L . Brewster and R. R. Rindfuss 2000 [ 9 ] ) .
1
The
institutional context, such as labor market arrangements and family-friendly poli-
c ies , also diers considerably from country to country both in the type and the
extent of these polic ies .
How can such dierences in household decisions as family-friendly polic ies , fer-
tility and the female labor supply, be explained? My paper proposes an explana-
tion based on gender discrimination in the labor market . More precisely, this
paper studies , through a general equilibrium model, the way in which gender dis-
crimination aects the related decis ions on fertility, the female labor supply and
family polic ies . Labor market discrimination, by reducing the wage of women,
inuences household decisions through three direct eects . An increase in gender
discrimination leads to both an increase in the specialization of women in house-
hold activities and to a decrease in the child-rearing opportunity cost in terms of
pay, as well as a decrease in the total household income. The two former eects
play in favour of fertility, while the latter tends to reduce it . Moreover, the joint
decrease in household income and the opportunity cost of children tends to
decrease the willingness to pay for family-friendly polic ies . The model provides a
U-shaped relationship between fertility and gender discrimination. More precisely,
it shows that an increase in gender discrimination may lead to a related decrease
in fertility, the female labor supply and family policies .
This paper is based on two crucial assumptions . First , that there is gender
discrimination in the labour market that leads to a gender wage gap. Thus for the
same skills and working time, women receive a lower wage than men because of
gender discrimination. In the literature, gender discrimination partly accounts for
the gender wage gap ( G . S . Becker 1 957 [ 5 ] ; Aigner and Cain 1 977 [ 5 ] ; S . Coate and
G . C . Loury 1 993 [ 1 2 ] ) and thus for the dierences in child-rearing opportunity cost
between spouses . S econdly, family-friendly polic ies may exist that decrease the
1 . J aumotte ( 2 003) [ 1 8 ] studies the factors determining the female labor supply in OECD countries
and nds that public spending in child care stimulates female employment. C ristina d'Addio and Mira
d' Ercole ( 2005 ) [ 1 3 ] s tudy the determinants of ferti lity and nd that ` ` total ferti lity rates are higher in
OECD countries with wider childcare availability and lower direct costs of children" .
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time cost of rearing children. These policies are endogenous and result from a
vote of agents . By decreasing the child-rearing time of parents and especially the
child-rearing time of women, these public policies inuence both fertility and
female employment decis ions ( K. L . Brewster and R. R. Rindfuss 1 996 [ 8 ] ; P . Apps
and R. Rees 2004 [ 4] ) .
2
The economy is composed of men and women organized as couples . Each man
and woman having the same preferences , all households are identical. Household
decisions are determined through a two-stage decis ion process as in Cavalcanti
and Tavares 2007 [ 1 4] . The rst stage refers to fertility, labor supply and indi-
vidual consumption choices . These decis ions are the result of the maximization of
a weighted sum of individual utilit ies under household budget constraint , the
weightings being the bargaining power of each partner. The second stage refers to
the size of public spending, more precisely the taxation level. The extent of
family-friendly polic ies is determined by a vote of households . Each member of
the couple chooses the taxation level which maximizes his or her indirect utility.
If spouses have dierent preferences there is no consensus concerning the expected
tax rate within the household, so the theory of probabilistic voting is used in the
second stage ( A. Lindbeck and J .W.Weibull 1 98 7 [ 2 0 ] ; T. Persson and G . Tabellini
2 000 [ 2 3 ] ) .
The model shows that dierent intensities of gender discrimination may
explain the dierences in household decisions across countries . Gender discrimina-
tion, by acting on the female wage, modies the allocation of tasks within the
household and implies a specialization of gender roles . The solution of the model
shows a U-shaped relationship between fertility and gender discrimination. If the
discrimination is not too great, its increase raises the cost of having children and
puts o the childbearing decis ion. Beyond a discrimination threshold there is an
inversion of this relationship and households choose to have more children. More-
over, an increase in gender discrimination discourages the participation of women
in the labor market as it reduces female wage. By remaining at home for longer,
women' s demand for public services decreases and agents vote for a lower tax
rate . Beyond a discrimination threshold, spouses choose a tax rate equal to zero
as the gains given by the public polic ies are not enough to oset their costs .
Hence, an increase in the discrimination level may imply a related decrease in fer-
tility, women' s employment and family policies .
To complement these results , the model is extended by introducing a child-
rearing function with imperfect substitutability of parents ' time and a collective
decision-making process within household. The rst extension allows the analysis
of the gender discrimination eects on men' s decisions and shows the negative
eect of the gender discrimination on the fathers ' childrearing time. The second is
divided into two parts . First , it is assumed that spouses have dierent prefer-
ences , which allows to take into account the eect of bargaining power on overall
2 . Apps and Rees ( 2 004) nd that ` ` countries which have individual rather than joint taxation, and
which support families through child care faci lities rather than child payments , are likely to have both
higher female employment and higher ferti lity" .
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household decis ions . S econdly, it is assumed that the wife ' s bargaining power
depends negatively on the gender discrimination. Bargaining power is aected by
relative wages of spouses , which are also inuenced by changes in discrimination
on the labor market . This extension allows us to study the way in which a collec-
tive approach to the decis ion-making process within the household modies the
results of the benchmark model ( Bourguignon and Chiappori 1 992 [ 7] ; Chiappori
1 997 [ 1 1 ] ) .
This work complements the literature relating fertility, the female labor supply
and public spending decis ions in which usually only women take care of children
and a unitary decis ion-making process is used. The model presented in this paper
is based on Cavalcanti and Tavares 2007 [ 1 4] and Galor and Weil 1 996 [ 1 5 ] in
which the gender wage gap is due to dierences in physical strength and reduces
as the economy grows . By taking into account the individual utilities of spouses ,
the current paper analyzes the specic behavior of each partner in the household
decision-making process . It discusses the voting system when spouses have dif-
ferent preferences , as well as the relative weight of agents in the household deci-
s ion-making process and the eect of changes in bargaining power on household
decisions . It also analyzes the way in which gender discrimination may aect
related decis ions of fertility, the female labor supply and family polic ies , while
Cavalcanti and Tavares are mainly interested in the link between the female labor
supply and the level of public spending.
The paper is structured as follows . S ection 2 provides an overview of some
empirical evidence regarding fertility rates , labor supply and family policies in
OECD countries . In S ection 3 , a general equilibrium model with gender discrimi-
nation is developed. S ection 4 presents the main results . S ection 5 proposes some
extensions of the benchmark model in which are successively introduced a child-
rearing function with imperfect substitutability, heterogeneity within household
and a collective household decision-making process ( Bourguignon and Chiappori
1 992 [ 7] ; Chiappori 1 997 [ 1 1 ] ) . A discussion about the main results follows . S ec-
tion 6 concludes .
2 S ome empirical evidence
S ince the inversion of the cross-country correlation between fertility and the
female labor supply in the middle of the 1 98 0s , OECD countries with the lowest
levels of female employment are also those that have low fertility rates ( Bettio
and Villa 1 998 [ 6 ] ) . And the countries with the highest levels of female employ-
ment are also those that have high fertility rates ( see Figure 6 in Appendix 1 ) .
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Figure 1 . Family Decisions in OECD countries in 2000
Source: Total ferti lity rates correspond to the number of children aged 1 5 to 49 years old per woman. Female labor
force partic ipation rates are those for persons aged 1 5 -64 years . Public spending on family benets is family spending on
services percentage of GDP .
The data come from the OECD database. All OECD countries are taken into account except Turkey.
Figure 1 points out a posit ive relationship between fertility and the female
labor supply, and between the female labor supply and family-friendly polic ies .
The dierences of behavior regarding fertility and women' s employment
choices may be explained by institutional changes in family policies and labor
market institutions ( A. Adesra 2 004 [ 1 ] ; T. Kogel 2 004 [ 1 9 ] ) . Family policies , by
inuencing the cost of having children, modify family behavior in terms of female
employment and fertility ( A. C . d' Addio and M.Mira d' Ercole 2005 [ 1 3 ] ) .
It has been observed that European countries which have the highest levels of
fertility rates and female labor supply are also those that have high state inter-
vention concerning the family. Countries can be organized into dierent clusters
according to their respective behaviors in terms of the fertility rate, women' s
labor force partic ipation rate and social policy ( Chesnais [ 1 0 ] and Handrais [ 1 6 ] ) .
3
Gender discrimination acting on wages may be an explanation of these various
household behaviors . Family decis ions in European countries have been employed
to illustrate this assumption. Two indicators of gender discrimination have been
selected: the percentage of the gender wage gap which is unexplained by dier-
ences in characteristics between men and women
4
, and the female economic
3 . S ome authors have organized countries in clusters according to their respective behavior con-
cerning family polic ies . For example, according to the classication proposed by Gauthier ( 2002 ) [ 2 ] ,
there are three groups of countries . The rst inc ludes Denmark, while the second includes France , the
United Kingdom, Austria, Germany and Ireland. And the last would comprise the Southern European
countries . We can see that this c lassication matches that of the discrimination index in Table 1 .
4. This index is calculated for the year 2000 and is taken from Meurs and Ponthieux 2005 . They
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activity rate as a percentage of the male rate . A similar classication of countries
selected is obtained by using both these indexes .
5
Part of the Gender Wage Gap Female Economic Activity Rate
Countries Unexplained by Gender ( aged 1 5 and above)
Dierences in Characteristics( % ) as % of Male Rate
Denmark 26 , 24 8 4
France 27, 72 76
United Kingdom 39 , 0 1 74
Austria 40 , 98 65
Germany 45 , 53 69
Ireland 50 , 78 52
Italy 58 , 2 5 58
Spain 62 , 02 56
Greece 8 8 , 8 4 58
Portugal 1 1 7, 44 71
Table 1 . Gender Discrimination Index in 2000
Sources : The index of the gender wage gap is calculated and taken from Meurs and Ponthieux 2005
[ 22 ] . The female economic activity rate as a percentage of the male rate comes from the Human
Development Report of 2002 , published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) [ 24] .
As this paper focuses on the eects of gender discrimination on household
decisions the former indicator, ` ` the part of the gender wage gap unexplained by
gender dierences in characteristics" , has been employed to study the relation-
ships between household decis ions and gender discrimination in the following g-
ures .
analyze the composition of the gender wage gap by dividing it into the gap due to characteristics and
that due to returns for these ten European countries . The part of the gender wage gap which is unex-
plained by dierences in characteristics is used in this paper as a discrimination index. The sample
studied , in the current paper , is limited to that of Meurs and Ponthieux, as it is dicult to procure the
rst discrimination index for many countries .
5 . Except for Portugal. In Table 1 , as in Portugal the unexplained part is larger than the total gap,
the rst discrimination index is higher than 1 00% . ` ` This suggests that the productive characteristics of
employed women are on average higher than those of men" .
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Figure 2 . Fertility Rate and Gender Dis crimination Index
Source : Fertility rates for 2 000 come from the OECD database. The indicator of gender dis crimination represents the
percentage of the gender wage gap which cannot be explained by dierences in character is tics between men and women.
Calculated for the year 2000 , from Meurs and Ponthieux 2005 [ 22 ] .
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Figure 3 . Female Labor Force Participation Rate and Gender D is crimination Index
Source : Women' s labor force participation rates in 2 000 from the OECD database. The indicator of gender discrimina-
tion represents the percentage of the gender wage gap which cannot be explained by dierences in characteristics
between men and women. Calculated for the year 2000 , from Meurs and Ponthieux 2005 [ 22 ] .
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Figure 4. Family-friendly Policies and Gender Discrimination Index
Source : Public spending on family benets is family spending on services as a percentage of GDP in 2000 from the
OECD database. The indicator of gender dis crimination represents the percentage of the gender wage gap which cannot
be explained by dierences in characteristics between men and women. Calculated for the year 2000 , from Meurs and
Ponthieux 2005 [ 22 ] .
These gures allow us to give an idea of the sort of relationship we can expect
to nd in the theoretical model. They show, overall, a negative relationship
between household decisions and the gender discrimination index. Moreover, in
the light of these data a U-shaped relationship could be suspected between the
fertility rate and the gender discrimination index.
The next section presents a general equilibrium model that analyzes the way
in which gender discrimination can aect family decisions .
3 The model
The relationship between household decisions and gender discrimination is studied
through a general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility, endogenous labor
supply and endogenous size of government spending. The framework of the model
is based on the article , written by Galor and Weil in 1 996 [ 1 5 ] and that by Caval-
canti and Tavares in 2007 [ 1 4] which introduces public spending to the model.
The economy is composed of men and women organized as couples and the level
of family-friendly policies is endogenously determined by a vote of agents . Family
policies are assumed to decrease the time that parents spend on their children.
8 S ection 3
3 . 1 Firm
The production technology uses one production factor, labor. There are two kinds
of worker, female workers , L
f
, and male workers , L
m
, which are perfect substi-
tutes . The marginal productivity of men and women is the same.
The production function is ,
f (L
f
+ L
m
) = A (L
f
+ L
m
) ;
where A > 0 is the total productivity of factors .
G iven the technology and the input prices , the representative rm chooses
inputs in order to maximize its prots .
max
L
f
; L
m
(L
f
; L
m
) = f (L
f
; L
m
)   w
m
L
m
  (w
f
+ d)L
f
Here the parameter d captures the problem of discrimination and can be inter-
preted as the taste for discrimination of employers as in the discrimination theo-
ries based on discriminative preferences pioneered by Gary Becker 1 957 [ 5 ] .
6
The rst order conditions associated with the representative rm' s problem
are:
w
f
= A   d and w
m
= A ; with d 2 [ 0 ; A

As this model is taking place in an economy in which men and women have the
same level of human capital, d represents the wage gap between men and women
per hour worked. Thus it determines the level of gender discrimination in the
labor market .
For the same skills and working time, women receive a lower wage than men
because of the gender discrimination, w
f
< w
m
.
3 . 2 Household
All households are identical in this society. Each agent has one unit of time which
is divided between child care and paid work, and has the same level of human
capital. Thus , the wage-dierence between spouses comes from gender discrimina-
tion in the labor market .
The preferences of spouses are assumed to be the same and are represented by
the following utility function:
U
i
=  ln( c
i
) +  ln( n) s : t i = f ; m
where n is the number of children per couple and c
i
the individual consumptions.
An additional assumption on parameters is made,  +  = 1 :
7
6 . The choice of taste-based discrimination can present some problems concerning the pers istence of
discrimination in the long run. However, it has been selected for its clarity in exposing the gender dis -
crimination eects on household decis ions which is the aim of this paper. For a survey of gender dis -
crimination theories see Nathalie Havet ( 2004) [ 1 7] .
7 : It is assumed that  +  = 1 only to s implify equations : This assumption does not change the results :
The model 9
The budget constraint of the household is
[w
f
( 1   h
f
) + w
m
( 1   h
m
) ] ( 1    ) = c
f
+ c
m
( 1 )
where h
i
s : t i = f ; m is parents ' time spent on parental care and child-rearing, and
 is the tax rate . Notice that prices of consumption goods are normalized at one.
In this model, government polic ies have an inuence on household decis ions .
Public revenues are collected by the government through a proportional tax  on
household income. The government budget is equilibrated and taxes are employed
to nance the per-couple government spending, g , intended to decrease the per-
child cost of rearing children.
The time allocated by parents to their children is
H = nh ( g ) = h
f
+ h
m
;
where h ( g ) represents the total t ime devoted by parents to each child :
Notice that the time spent by a woman or a man on children are perfect sub-
stitutes .
Household Decis ions
Couples determine the number of children, the size of government and indi-
vidual consumptions sub ject to a budget constraint that reects the allocation of
time between labor supply and child-rearing.
Household decis ions are xed through a two-step decision process . The rst
stage refers to fertility, labor supply and individual consumption choices . These
decisions are the result of the maximization of a weighted sum of individual utili-
ties under the household budget constraint . In the maximization, the weightings
are the bargaining power of each spouse. In the rest of the paper, these decisions
will be noted as intra-family decis ions .
The second stage refers to the size of public spending, more precisely the taxa-
tion level. Each member of the couple chooses the taxation level which maximizes
his or her indirect utility. Public spending is exclusively devoted to decreasing the
time that parents spend on their children.
Intra-family Decis ions and Specialization :
The couple' s program for intra-family decisions :
Max
c
f
; c
m
; n ; h
f
; h
m
 [ ( 1   ) ln( c
f
) +  ln( n) ] + ( 1    ) [ ( 1   ) ln( c
m
) +  ln( n) ]
s : t: [w
f
( 1   h
f
) + w
m
( 1   h
m
) ] ( 1    ) = c
f
+ c
m
;
H = nh ( g ) = h
f
+ h
m
;
where  is the bargaining power of the wife .
Notice that the opportunity cost of child-rearing is stronger for men than for
women, because of w
f
< w
m
. Due to the gender discrimination, there is a special-
ization of gender roles within the couple based on comparative advantage and
budget constraint ( 1 ) . In the household only the woman takes care of the children
and the man spends all his time on the labor market .
h
m
= 0 and nh ( g ) = h
f
1 0 S ection 3
Based on gender specialization, the new couple' s program for intra-family deci-
s ions is :
Max
c
f
; c
m
; n ; t
f
 [ ( 1   ) ln( c
f
) + ln( n) ] + ( 1    ) [ ( 1   ) ln( c
m
) + ln( n) ]
s : t : [w
f
t
f
+ w
m
] ( 1    ) = c
f
+ c
m
;
1 = t
f
+ nh ( g) ;
where t
f
is the time spent on the labor market by the woman.
The intra-family decis ions are expressed in relation to government spending.
S o each partner votes for the optimal level of public spending taking into account
its eects on the woman' s trade-o between the labor market and child-rearing.
The le ve l o f fe rt ility cho ice is
n =
(w
f
+ w
m
)
w
f
h ( g)
;
The number of children is limited by the time constraint of women and depends
on household income. It is also a decreasing function of women' s child-rearing
opportunity cost , w
f
h ( g) .
The individual co nsumptio n dec is io ns are
c
f
=  ( 1   ) [w
f
+ w
m
] ( 1   ) and c
m
= ( 1    ) ( 1   ) [w
f
+ w
m
] ( 1   )
The individual consumptions depend exclusively on total disposable income.
Tax rate determination
Having xed their intra-family choices , each spouse chooses the level of tax
rate that maximizes his or her indirect utility.
The budget of the government is balanced throughout. Therefore,
g = ( 1   ) (w
f
+ w
m
) ;
where w
m
is tax on the husband' s paid work and w
f
( 1   h ( g ) n) is tax on the
wife ' s paid work. Thus,
 =
g
( 1  ) (w
f
+ w
m
)
;
As in the article by Cavalcanti and Tavares ( 2 007) [ 1 4] , the tax rate  is
endogenously determined by a vote of the adult population.
8
8 . However, contrary to Cavalcanti and Tavares 2007 [ 1 4] , the tax rate decis ion is made at indi-
vidual level and not at household level , as in my paper the determination of tax rate is non-cooperative.
This assumption introduces the discussion about voting systems when men and women vote for dierent
tax rates in Section 5 . 2 .
The model 1 1
The indirect utility of each spouse is
V
i
(w
i
; g ) = ( 1  ) ln( c
i
( g ) ) +  ln( n( g ) ) s : t i = m; f :
Each partner xes the tax rate which maximizes his/her indirect utility,
g = argmax
g> 0
V (w
i
; g )
The time allocated by women to each child is assumed to be a decreasing function
of public spending,
h ( g ) =  [ 1 + g ]
  "
;
where " > 0 and  is the minimal time that parents have to devote to each child.
More precisely,  represents the time cost of children for parents when there is no
public spending. The parameter " captures the eciency of family polic ies .
Each partne r choo se s his/he r prefe red le ve l o f taxatio n in so lving the fo llowing
maximizat io n pro b lem :
Max
g
i
V
i
= ( 1  ) ln[ c
i
( g
i
) ] + ln[n( h ( g
i
) ) ] ; i = f ; m
The preferred tax rate of agents is given by the following expression,
9

i
=
"
" + ( 1   )
 
1
(w
f
+ w
m
) ( " + ( 1  ) )
; i = f ; m
Spouses choose the same level of tax rate . So there is a consensus within the
couple concerning the expected tax rate in the society.
The tax rate is positively linked with the household income. The tax rate has
two eects on the labor supply decisions . A high tax rate discourages the labor
supply of the household. But it also reduces the opportunity cost of child-rearing
for women and increases women' s labor force partic ipation. S o the nal eect of
the tax rate on labor supply is ambiguous .
Before examining the equilibrium, some intermediate results can be quoted :
w
m
= A ; w
f
= A   d ; L
f
= t
f
and L
m
= t
m
;
where w
m
, w
f
, L
f
, t
f
, L
m
and t
m
are respectively male wage, female wage,
women' s labor demand, women' s labor supply, men' s labor demand and men' s
labor supply.
4 Implicat ions of gender discrimination
Proposition 1 . At the e quilib rium, two so lutio ns co uld be ident ied b y dierent
gende r discriminatio n le ve ls . An inte rio r so lut io n which is charac te rized b y a po si-
t ive tax rate ,  > 0 . And a co rne r so lut io n which is spec ied b y a tax rate e qual to
ze ro ,  = 0 if A > d > 2A  
1
"
.
9 . For intermediate results see Appendix 2 .
1 2 S ection 4
4. 1 Interior Solution :
The tax rate is given b y,
 =
"
" + ( 1  )
 
1
( 2A   d) ( " + ( 1  ) )
Proposition 2 . If d < 2A  
1
"
, the marginal gain given b y pub lic spending com-
pensate s fo r the marginal co s t o f the la t t e r and adult s vo te fo r a s tric t ly po s it ive
tax rate ,  > 0 .
The tax rate is a decreasing function of the gender discrimination,
d
dd
< 0 and
so the higher the gender discrimination, the smaller the tax rate .
Moreover, the condition under which the tax rate  is positive could also be
analyzed as an eciency constraint concerning family policies , in other words a
constraint on " . Indeed, if the welfare services oered by the state are too low,
the voters choose a low tax rate.
The numbe r o f children cho sen b y the co uple is given b y,
n =
 ( ")
"
( 2A   d) [ 1 + ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) ]
"
 ( " + ( 1   ) )
"
(A   d)
Proposition 3 . There is a U- shaped re la tio nship be tween fe rt ility and gende r dis -
criminat io n if " > ( 1 +
1
2A( 1   )
) .
1 0
If this co ndit io n is no t sat ised, the fe rtility
dec is io n is an increas ing func tio n o f gende r discriminatio n.
The interpretation of gender discrimination eects on fertility decisions can be
made in two parts .
If the level of gender discrimination is not too high, fertility is negatively
linked to gender discrimination,
dn
dd
< 0 and an increase in gender discrimination
discourages fertility. To explain this , three eects can be pointed out : two price
eects and an income eect .
The price eect is shown in studying the woman' s opportunity cost of child-
rearing, h ( g) w
f
, and can be divided into two eects . The direct price eect
implies that a decrease of female wage, w
f
, due to a higher discrimination level,
reduces the child-rearing opportunity cost in terms of pay. Thus, as women are
paid less , they are discouraged from partic ipating in the labor market and they
might decide to have more children. This eect has a positive impact on child-
bearing choice . The indirect price eect implies that a higher discrimination level
leads to less public spending, because in this case the taxation level is smaller. So
a smaller tax rate implies a rise in women' s opportunity cost in terms of time,
h ( g ) , and has a negative impact on fertility choice.
1 0 . For intermediate results see Appendix 3 .
Implications of gender discrimination 1 3
The income eect can be set out as follows. A higher discrimination level
reduces the female wage
1 1
and therefore the household income. Having children is
costly, so a reduction of the household income discourages the couple from having
more children. This has a negative impact on fertility choice.
In conclusion, the negative eects dominate and a higher gender discrimina-
tion level discourages fertility choice .
However, when the discrimination is beyond a certain threshold there is an
inversion of the relationship between fertility and gender discrimination. The
childbearing decision becomes an increasing function of the gender discrimination.
The woman' s labo r supply is given b y,
t
f
= 1  
( 2A   d)
(A   d)
The woman' s labor supply is negatively correlated with the gender discrimination
level,
d t
f
dd
< 0 .
The higher the gender discrimination level, the smaller the women' s labor
force participation. A higher level of discrimination against women decreases
women' s wage and discourages women' s labor force participation. Furthermore, as
a consequence of the specialization of gender roles , the gender gap in employment
widens when the number of children increases , all other things being equal.
Moreover, as an increase of the gender discrimination level reduces the extent
of family-friendly polic ies , mothers ' family responsibilities and the limited avail-
ability of adequate child-care services may also reduce women' s labor force partic-
ipation.
Individual co nsumptio ns are also negatively correlated with the discrimination
level. A higher gender discrimination level reduces household income for a xed
working time and decreases individual consumptions ,
c
f
=  ( 1   )
[ ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) + 1 ]
( " + ( 1   ) )
and c
m
= ( 1    ) ( 1   )
[ ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) + 1 ]
( " + ( 1   ) )
:
4. 2 Corner solution :
Proposition 4. The co rne r so lut io n exis t s if A > d > 2A  
1
"
and co rre sponds to
the s ituatio n in which the re is no pub lic spending,  = 0 .
As the gender discrimination level is very high, d > 2A  
1
"
, the marginal gain
given by public spending does not compensate for the marginal cost of the latter.
Adults vote for a tax rate equal to zero.
1 1 . The establishment of gender discrimination only takes into account the disadvantage of women
on the labor market and not the poss ible advantage of men.
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The number of children chosen by the household is given by,
n =
( 2A   d)
(A   d) 
Fertility is positively associated with gender discrimination,
dn
dd
> 0 . A higher level
of gender discrimination encourages fertility. To explain this result , two eects
can be pointed out: a price eect and an income eect .
The price eect is illustrated by studying women' s opportunity cost of child-
rearing, w
f
h ( g ) . As there is no public spending, there is no indirect eect . The
price eect implies that a decrease in women' s wage, w
f
, due to a higher discrimi-
nation level, reduces the child-rearing opportunity cost in terms of pay. Thus as
women are paid less , they are discouraged from partic ipating in the labor market
which leaves them more time free to take care of children. And they can decide to
have more children. This has a positive eect on fertility choice .
The income eect can be analyzed in the following way. A higher gender dis-
crimination level reduces women' s wage and household income. Having children is
costly, so a reduction of household income discourages couples from having a lot
of children. This has a negative impact on fertility choice .
In short , the price eect dominates the income eect and a higher gender dis-
crimination level stimulates fertility choice . This result coincides with the litera-
ture which species that childbearing decis ions are negatively linked with female
wages .
If there is a U-shaped relationship between fertility and discrimination, this
case corresponds to the increasing part of the U-shaped function.
The woman' s labo r supply is given b y,
t
f
= 1  
 ( 2A   d)
(A   d)
;
The gender discrimination level also has a negative impact on the female labor
supply,
d t
f
dd
< 0 .
Individual co nsumptio ns are still negatively correlated with the discrimination
level. A higher discrimination level reduces household income for a xed working
time and decreases individual consumptions ,
c
f
=  ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) and c
m
= ( 1    ) ( 1   ) ( 2A   d)
To sum up, gender discrimination, by acting on wages, modies the allocation
of tasks within the household. If discrimination is not too great, its increase raises
the cost of having children and puts o the childbearing decis ion. Beyond a dis-
crimination threshold there is an inversion of this relationship and households
have more children. As gender discrimination reduces female wage, its increase
discourages the entry of women into the labor market . By remaining at home for
longer, the female demand for public services decreases and spouses vote for a
lower tax rate .
Implications of gender discrimination 1 5
It seems that the gender wage gap aects household decisions and, more pre-
cisely, the allocation of time between paid and unpaid work.
1 2
Some extensions of
the benchmark model are now proposed in order to analyze the eects of gender
discrimination on men' s decis ions , and on household decisions when spouses dier
in their preferences .
5 Further Issues
The purpose of the following extension is to study the gender discrimination
eects on men' s behavior. Indeed, as men do not take care of children in the
benchmark model, gender discrimination does not aect the male labor supply.
But, by introducing a childrearing function with an imperfect substitutability of
the parents ' time into the benchmark model, men' s decis ions are no longer inde-
pendent of gender discrimination.
5 . 1 Imperfect Substitutability of Parents ' Childrearing
Time
Even if the data show that men spend less time with children than women, all the
same they are allocating a small part of their available time to child care. So a
childrearing function with imperfect substitutability of parents ' t ime is introduced
into the benchmark model.
The childrearing func t io n is ,
h ( g ) n = ( h
f
)

( h
m
)
( 1   )
where  means the eciency of female childrearing time and 1    means the e-
ciency of male childrearing time.
1 3
Men, like women, have to trade o between childrearing time and working
time. The higher  is , the more time women devote to children and vice versa for
men.
A U-shaped relationship between gender discrimination and fertility can also
be observed if the condition " >
( 2   1 )
2A( 1   )
+ ( 2    1 ) is satised ( see Appendix to
S ection 4) . Gender discrimination still has a negative impact on women' s labor
supply and on the tax rate level.
However, gender discrimination has a positive eect on men' s labor supply. As
higher gender discrimination discourages his wife from partic ipating in the labor
force, the husband has to work longer in order to compensate for the loss of
income due to the decrease in his wife' s working time.
1 2 . These decis ions also depend on cultural attitudes . S ee Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti ( 2 004) [ 25 ] .
1 3 . If  = 1 , there is a total specialization of gender roles within the household, and the results of
this model correspond to those of the benchmark model.
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The woman' s childrearing t ime is positively linked to the discrimination level,
dh
f
dd
> 0 :
h
f
=
( 2A   d)
(A   d)
The man' s childrearing t ime is negatively related with the discrimination level,
dh
m
dd
< 0 :
h
m
=
( 1    ) ( 2A   d)
A
Women are devoting more time to children than men because of gender discrimi-
nation, whatever  . Thus , as women are discriminated against in the labor
market, men have to oset the loss of income implied by the gender discrimina-
tion by working longer and decreasing their childrearing time. So discrimination
in the labor market may be one of the explanatory factors for the low investment
of men in domestic activities that all empirical studies reveal ( C . Sofer and
S . S . Rizavi 2008 [ 26 ] ; M . Burda, D . S . Hamermesh and P.Weil 2 007 [ 2 1 ] ) .
1 4
To sum up, the introduction of a childrearing function with imperfect substi-
tutability of parents ' time allows us to take into account the eects of gender dis-
crimination on individual male decis ions . Because of gender role specialization in
the benchmark model, gender discrimination has no inuence on men' s employ-
ment. However, in this extension, due to the new trade-o for men between chil-
dren and market work, a positive relationship is observed between the level of
gender discrimination and the level of men' s labor force partic ipation. This result
lets us presume that male employment is negatively related to the extent of
family policies , as the latter is still negatively related to gender discrimination.
1 5
Up to now, it has been assumed that spouses have the same preferences . How-
ever, it is feasible to think that men and women can dier in terms of preferences .
5 . 2 Heterogeneity within household and a collective
approach to the decision-making process :
5 . 2 . 1 Heterogeneity of preferences within the household:
It is now assumed that spouses have dierent preferences and individuals are sim-
ilar within a gender group.
The program of a repre sentative co uple afte r the spec ia lizat io n o f gende r ro le s
is given as follows ,
Max
c
f
; c
m
; n
 [ 
f
ln( c
f
) + 
f
ln( n) ] + ( 1    ) [ 
m
ln( c
m
) + 
m
ln( n) ]
s : t: [w
f
( 1   h ( g ) n) + w
m
] ( 1    ) = c
f
+ c
m
1 4. In the Southern European countries such as Italy where gender discrimination is high, the par-
ticipation of men in the domestic sphere is low. In the Northern European countries such as Denmark,
where gender discrimination is lower, male participation in domestic activities is much greater.
1 5 . as in Cavalcanti and Tavares ( 2 007) [ 1 4]
Further Issues 1 7
It is assumed that 
f
+ 
f
= 1 and 
m
+ 
m
= 1 .
1 6
In a non-cooperative decision-making process of tax rate, spouses choose dif-
ferent levels of taxation:

i
=

i
"
( ( 1   
i
) + 
i
")
 
( 1   
i
)
( 2A   d) (  ( 1   
f
) + ( 1    ) ( 1   
m
) ) ( 1   
i
+ 
i
")
; i = f ; m
Proposition 5 . If women have highe r prefe rence s fo r children than men, 
f
> 
m
,
women would vo te fo r a highe r tax rate than men, 
f
> 
m
.
As spouses have dierent preferences and each member of the household does
not vote for the same tax rate, a discussion about the voting system could follow.
If women have no right to vote or are constrained in their voting, the tax rate
applied is the men' s one. However, if women have voting rights and are free in
their voting decisions, there is no consensus concerning the tax rate applied in the
society.
The economy is composed only of two kinds of individual, men who vote for

m
and women who vote for 
f
. As there is no majority in the society because the
proportions of men and women are the same, every tax rate between that chosen
by men and that chosen by women could be a solution. S o the theory of proba-
bilistic voting is used to x the tax rate applied ( A. Lindbeck and J .W.Weibull
1 98 7 [ 2 0 ] ; T. Persson and G . Tabellini 2 000 [ 2 3 ] ) .
The le ve l o f taxatio n is xed b y so lving the fo llowing maximizat io n pro b lem :
Max
g
[
1
2
V
f
( c
f
; n) +
1
2
V
m
( c
m
; n) ]
where V
f
and V
m
are respectively the indirect utility of the woman and of the
man.
1 7
The tax rate is given b y the fo llowing expre ss io n:
( d ;  ) =
"( 
f
+ 
m
)
B
 
( 1   
f
) + ( 1   
m
)
( 2A   d)B [ ( 1   
f
)  + ( 1  
m
) ( 1   ) ]
with B = [ ( 1   
f
) + ( 1   
m
) + "( 
f
+ 
m
) ]
The woman' s labo r supply is given b y,
t
f
( d ;  ) = 1  
( 2A   d) ( 
f
+ ( 1    ) 
m
)
(A   d)
Proposition 6 . If women value children more than men, 
f
> 
m
, an increase o f
the wife ' s bargaining power,  , will bo th reduce the tax rate and the time spent b y
women on the labo r marke t (
d( d;  )
d
< 0 and
dt
f
(d;  )
d
< 0 ).
1 6 . This assumption allows us to change individual preferences without modifying the bargaining
powers within the household. Moreover, this assumption does not limit the set of poss ibilities con-
cerning preferences .
1 7. For intermediate results see Appendix 5 .
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The fe rt ility is ,
1 8
n =
( 2A   d) ( "( 
f
+ 
m
) )
"

~
[ 1 + ( 2A   d) ( 1   
~
) ]
"
 (A   d) [ ( 1   
f
) + ( 1   
m
) + ( 
f
+ 
m
) " ]
"
With 
~
= ( 
f
+ ( 1    ) 
m
)
If it is assumed that 
f
> 
m
, an increase of  will both increase the total time
spent by women on children, h
f
, and reduce public spending, g . The nal eect
on the time spent by women on each child, h ( g) , is non-linear and depends on the
public spending eciency and on its level, respectively " and g . Hence, as the
cross derivative of h ( g ) could be positive or negative in terms of " and g (
d
2
h( g)
dgd"
<
0 or > 0 ) , the eect of an increase of  on fertility is non-monotonous . Three kinds
of situation emerge and can be summarized by Figure 5 .
Figure 5 . Eect of women' s bargaining power on fertility
The eects of discrimination on household decis ions are still the same. Indeed,
a U-shaped relationship between gender discrimination and fertility can also be
found, and gender discrimination still has a negative impact on women' s labor
supply and the tax rate level.
5 . 2 . 2 Collective approach to the decision-making process
The bargaining power of each member within the household is now assumed to
depend on gender discrimination, d . The wife' s bargaining power is assumed to be
negatively linked to the gender discrimination level,
d ( d)
dd
< 0 .
Female Labo r Supply Dec is io ns and Tax Rate De te rminatio n
1 8 . When spouses have dierent preferences , tax rates , female labor supply and fertility decis ions
are inuenced by their bargaining power. Up to now, these dec is ions were only dependent on spouses '
preferences and wages .
Further Issues 1 9
If men value children more than women, 
m
> 
f
, gender discrimination still has a
negative eect on the female labor supply and the tax rate . However, if it is
women who value children more, 
f
> 
m
, the discrimination eect on these deci-
s ions is ambiguous. Gender discrimination plays a part in the determination of
these decis ions in two dierent ways; a direct eect and an indirect eect through
the bargaining power shifts ( see Appendix 6) . If the direct eect prevails , the
gender discrimination still has a negative eect on both decisions, as has already
been found. However, if the indirect eect prevails , an increase in the gender dis-
crimination level has a positive impact on the female labor supply and on the tax
rate . As gender discrimination reduces the female bargaining power within the
household and men pay less attention to children, an increase in the discrimina-
tion plays in favour of consumption. Hence, women increase their labor supply
and the chosen tax rate is higher. These results may be matched with Portuguese
data. Indeed, while among Southern European countries Portugal has the highest
level of gender discrimination, its family polic ies on benets in kind are the most
generous of the group and the female labor force partic ipation is also the highest
of the cluster ( see Section one) .
Fertility Dec is io ns
The relationship between fertility and gender discrimination is less clear, as it
depends on preferences and assumptions made concerning variables of the model
such as the eciency of family polic ies , " , and the total productivity of fac-
tors , A ( see Appendix 6) .
6 C onclusion
In this paper, the relationships between gender discrimination and household
decisions have been presented through a general equilibrium model. The model
shows that dierent levels of gender discrimination may explain divergences in
household decisions across countries . The solution shows a U-shaped relationship
between fertility and gender discrimination. An increase in the discrimination
level may lead to a related decrease in fertility, women' s employment and family
policies . Beyond a discrimination threshold, spouses vote for a tax rate equal to
zero. These results match with the positive correlation between childbearing and
women' s labor supply which has been observed since the mid-1 98 0s in OECD
countries . Female labor force partic ipation and the size of public spending vary in
the same way as in Cavalcanti and Tavares 2007 [ 1 4] .
S ome extensions of this paper can be proposed. Discrimination can be ana-
lyzed as social norms which dier from country to country. Besides , beyond the
problem of discrimination, there are also the cultural attitudes toward working
mothers which play a role in female labor supply decisions and more generally in
household decis ions . This would be the sub ject of further research. An econo-
metric analysis could also be done to test the relevance of this model.
20 S ection 6
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Appendix 1
Figure 6 . Correlation between fertility rates and female activity rates ( line) and between fer-
tility rates and female labor participation rates ( dashed line)
Source : These correlations have been calculated for ten European countries : Austria, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kindgom. Data
come from the OECD database.
Appendix 2
First order condition of the maximization of spouses' indirect utilities :
"
( 1 + g)
 
( 1   )
( 1   ) (w
f
+ w
m
)   g
= 0
From this condition the expression of public spending can be found,
g =
[ "(w
f
+ w
m
)   1 ] ( 1   )
( " + 1   )
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and also the time devoted by women to each child:
h( g) =  [
" [ 1 + (w
f
+ w
m
) ( 1   ) ]
( " + 1   )
]
  "
Appendix 3
The relationship between gender discrimination and fertility can be deduced from the derivative
of fertility:
dn( d)
dd
= Z
[ 1 + ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) ]
"  1
(A   d)
2
f [ 1 + ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) ]A   ( 2A   d) "( 1   ) (A   d) g
with Z =
( ")
"
 ( " + 1   )
"
Given d 2 [ 0 ; A [ , the derivative of fertility,
dn( d)
dd
, could be negative if the condition on public
spending eciency, " > ( 1 +
1
2A ( 1   )
) , is satised.
Appendix 4
The couple' s program for intra-family decisions :
Max
c
f
; c
m
; n ; h
f
; h
m
 [  ln( c
f
) +  ln(n) ] + ( 1    ) [  ln( c
m
) +  ln(n) ]
s : t: [w
f
( 1   h
f
) + w
m
( 1   h
m
) ] ( 1   ) = c
f
+ c
m
;
H = nh ( g) = (h
f
)

( h
m
)
( 1    )
and  +  = 1
The expression of the tax rate applied is the same as in the previous model. However, that of
fertility diers from the benchmark model:
n =

"+ 1
( 1   )
( 1    )


"
"
( 2A   d) [ 1 + ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) ]
"
 ( " + ( 1   ) )
"
A
( 1    )
(A   d)

dn(d)
dd
= s f   ( 1   ) "( 2A   d) (A   d) + [ 1 + ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) ] [A( 2   1 ) + d( 1   ) ] g
with s =

"+ 1
( 1   )
( 1    )


"
"
 ( " + 1   )
"
A
( 1    )
[ 1 + ( 1   ) ( 2A   d) ]
"  1
(A   d)
+ 1
Given d 2 [ 0 ; A [ , the derivative of fertility,
dn( d)
dd
, could be negative if the condition on public
spending eciency, " >
( 2    1 )
2A ( 1   )
+ ( 2   1 ) , is satised.
Appendix 5
Results coming from the intra-family decisions program :
c
f
( g) =
 ( 1   
f
) ( 1   )
 ( 1   
f
) + ( 1    ) ( 1   
m
)
[ ( 1   
f
  ( 1    ) 
m
) ( 2A   d) ]
c
m
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m
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)
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f
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m
)
[ ( 1   
f
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m
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m
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f
)
 [ 1 + g ]
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(A   d)
Expressions of spouses' indirect utility are,
V
i
= 
i
ln(n( g) ) + ( 1   
i
) ln( c
i
( g) ) s : t: i = f ; m
Following the probabilistic voting rule, the rst order condition of the maximization program for
xing the tax rate is :
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f
+ 
m
) "
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f
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m
)
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m
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From this condition the expression of g can be found and after that of the tax rate in using the
government budget constraint ( =
g
( 2A   d) ( 1   
f
  ( 1    ) 
m
)
) .
dn( d;  )
d
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Appendix 6
Eects of gender discrimination on household decisions:
dt
f
( d;  (d) )
dd
=
dt
f
( d;  ( d) )
dd
+
dt
f
( d;  (d) )
d
d ( d)
dd
(   ) ( + ) if
m
> 
f
(   )
(   ) if 
f
> 
m
d( d;  ( d) )
dd
=
d( d;  (d) )
dd
+
d( d;  ( d) )
d
d ( d)
dd
(   ) ( + ) if
m
> 
f
(   )
(   ) if 
f
> 
m
dn( d;  (d) )
dd
=
dn( d;  (d) )
dd
+
dn(d;  ( d) )
d
d ( d)
dd
(   ) or ( + ) (   ) or ( + ) (   )
24 S ection 7
